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     here are two views regarding the lawfulness of States conducting military 
operations within the exclusive economic zones (EEZ) of coastal States.  
 
Majority View. All nations have an absolute right under international law, 
as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UN-
CLOS), to conduct military activities beyond the territorial sea of another 
nation. The EEZ was created for the sole purpose of granting coastal States 
greater control over the resources adjacent to their coasts.1 Efforts by a 
handful of nations to expand coastal State authority in the EEZ to include 
residual rights were rejected by a majority of the States participating in the 
UNCLOS negotiations.2 Most nations agreed with the position that “military 
operations, exercises and activities have always been regarded as internation-
ally lawful uses of the sea. The right to conduct such activities will continue 
to be enjoyed by all States in the EEZ.”3 
  
Minority View. Dissatisfied with the outcome of the negotiations, 17 na-
tions—Bangladesh, Brazil, Burma, Cape Verde, China, India, Indonesia, 
Iran, Kenya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, North Korea, Pakistan, Portugal, 
Thailand, and Uruguay—have sought to unilaterally expand their control in 
the EEZ by imposing restrictions on military operations and other lawful 
activities. In the Indo-Pacific region, these illegal restrictions take different 
forms including: (1) prior notice or prior consent to conduct military activi-
ties; (2) application of domestic environmental laws (resource-related con-
cerns) (3) restrictions on military marine data collection (military surveys) 
and hydrographic surveys; and (4) restrictions on non-peaceful purposes, 
such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance operations (ISR) (na-
tional security concerns). None of these claims have a basis in customary 
international law, State practice or UNCLOS, and have been challenged dip-
lomatically and operationally by the United States. 
 
General Restrictions on Military Activities. UNCLOS provides coastal 
State authority over certain foreign military activities; however, none of these 
limitations apply in the EEZ. Ships in innocent passage in the territorial sea 
may not engage in certain military activities, including: threat or use of force, 
use of weapons, intelligence gathering, acts of propaganda, launching and 
landing of aircraft and other military devices, military oceanographic surveys, 











restrictions apply in archipelagic waters.5 Submarines and other underwater 
vehicles engaged in innocent passage in foreign territorial seas and archipe-
lagic waters must navigate on the surface and show their flag.6 Ships engaged 
in transit passage or archipelagic sea lanes passage may not conduct survey 
activities, and may not threaten or use force.7 Similar restrictions are not 
found in Part V of UNCLOS, and therefore do not apply to warships, mili-
tary aircraft and other sovereign immune ships and aircraft operating in or 
over the EEZ. 
 
Environmental/Resource-Related Concerns. Some coastal States pur-
port to apply their domestic environmental law to limit foreign military ac-
tivities in the EEZ citing Article 56, which grants coastal States exclusive 
resource rights and jurisdiction over the protection of the marine environ-
ment. China has also argued that use of sonar by U.S. Special Mission Ships 
(SMS) in its EEZ harms marine mammals and disrupts fishing stocks, and 
that China therefore has authority to regulate such activities. China’s cites a 
2007 U.S. district court ruling against the U.S. Navy that restricted the use 
of mid-frequency active sonar during naval exercises off California. China’s 
reliance on this case is misplaced, however, as the U.S. Supreme Court over-
turned the district court opinion in 2008, holding that there was no evidence 
marine mammals were being harmed by the Navy’s use of sonar during the 
exercises.8 These environmental arguments also ignore a plain reading of 
UNCLOS, which specifically provides that the environmental provisions of 
the Convention do not apply to warships, naval auxiliaries or other govern-
ment-owned or operated non-commercial ships or aircraft. The Convention 
merely requires that sovereign immune ships and aircraft make best efforts 
to act consistent with the Convention, but only as long as such actions are 
reasonable and practicable and do not impair the operations or operational 

















Some coastal States 
argue that all ma-
rine data collection 
in the EEZ is 
equivalent to ma-
rine scientific re-
search (MSR), and 
is therefore subject 
to coastal State 
control under Arti-
cle 56. To the ex-
tent coastal State 
laws purport to 
regulate hydro-
graphic surveys 
and military marine data collection activities (military oceanographic surveys 
and ISR), they are inconsistent with UNCLOS, State practice, and customary 
international law. UNCLOS clearly differentiates between MSR, surveys, and 
military activities in various articles, and prohibits ships engaged in innocent 
passage to conduct “research or survey activities.”10 Likewise, ships engaged 
in transit passage and archipelagic sea lanes passage may not conduct MSR 
or hydrographic surveys.11 In contrast, Article 56 and Part XIII only grant 
coastal States jurisdiction over MSR, and Article 87 refers only to “scientific 
research.” Thus, while coastal States may regulate MSR and surveys in the 
territorial sea, archipelagic waters, international straits, and archipelagic sea 
lanes, they may not regulate military oceanographic and hydrographic sur-
veys in the contiguous zone and the EEZ. 
 
Restrictions on Non-Peaceful Purposes. Some States argue that military 
activities are inconsistent with the peaceful purposes provision of UNCLOS, 
which provides that States shall “refrain from any threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State.”12 UN-
CLOS, however, distinguishes between “threat or use of force” on the one 
hand, and other military-related activities, on the other. Article 19(2)(a) 
Exclusive Economic Zone. Coastal States may claim 
a 200-nm exclusive economic zone (EEZ) measured 
from the baseline. The EEZ is not subject to coastal 
State sovereignty. EEZs comprise 38 percent of the 











repeats the language of Article 301, prohibiting ships in innocent passage 
from engaging in “any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territo-
rial integrity or political independence of the coastal State.” The remaining 
seven subparagraphs of Article 19(2) restrict other military activities (for ex-
ample, use of weapons, intelligence collection, flight operations, etc.) in the 
territorial sea.13 The distinction between “threat or use of force” and other 
types of military activities in Article 19 clearly demonstrates that UNCLOS 
does not automatically equate use of force with other military acts. Most 
experts that have examined this issue agree that the peaceful purposes pro-
vision only prohibits military activities that are inconsistent with Article 2(4) 
of the U.N. Charter, and that all other military activities are therefore per-
mitted in the EEZ.14 The U.N. Security Council likewise concluded that mil-
itary activities consistent with Article 2(4) and Article 51 of the U.N. Charter 
are not prohibited by UNCLOS,15 and the International Court of Justice 
ruled that U.S. naval maneuvers conducted off the coast of Nicaragua from 
1982-1985 did not constitute a threat or use of force against Nicaragua.16 A 
number of multilateral instruments similarly recognize that military activities 
at sea are lawful and do not, per se, constitute a “threat or use of force against 
the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence” of other 
States.17 
 
Restrictions on ISR. A corollary argument is that close-in ISR operations 
in the EEZ violate coastal State sovereignty and threaten the State’s national 
security interests. This position is not supported by State practice or a plain 
reading of UNCLOS, the Chicago Convention, or any other applicable in-
ternational instruments. UNCLOS addresses intelligence collection in Arti-
cle 19(2)(c), and restricts ships engaged in innocent passage from “collecting 
information to the prejudice of the defense or security of the coastal State.” 
An analogous provision does not appear in Part V of the Convention re-
garding the EEZ. Moreover, neither UNCLOS nor the Chicago Convention 
allows coastal States to regulate military aircraft seaward of national air-
space.18 Thus, States may lawfully engage in ISR seaward of the territorial sea 
or national airspace without providing the coastal State notice or obtaining 
its consent.19 
A number of nations, including the United States, China, Russia, Japan, 
Australia and others, routinely conduct ISR missions in international air-
space, and in most cases these missions occur without incident or adverse 
political repercussions. With the exception of China, most coastal States that 











aircraft intruded into their “national” airspace, rather than questioning the 
legality of intelligence collection generally.20 For example, between 2004 and 
2014, over 50 Russian aircraft have been intercepted in the U.S., Canadian, 
Japanese, South Korean, and British air defense identification zones. In each 
case, the Russian aircraft were intercepted and monitored, but were permit-
ted to continue their mission when it was determined that they would not 
penetrate the national airspace of the coastal State.21 
The validity of aerial reconnaissance was brought before the U.N. Secu-
rity Council by the Soviet Union in 1960. Following the shoot down of an 
American U-2 spy plane near Sverdlovsk in May, the Soviets requested that 
the Security Council adopt a resolution that would have labeled the U-2 
flights as “acts of aggression” under the Charter. The draft resolution failed 
by a vote of 7 to 2 (with 2 abstentions).22 Two months later, the Soviets shot 
down an America RB-47H spy plane while it was conducting a reconnais-
sance mission over the Barents Sea near the Kola Peninsula. Again, the So-
viets introduced a draft resolution that would have labeled the surveillance 
mission an “act of aggression,” but the resolution was rejected by a vote of 
9 to 2.23 These decisions arguably confirm that peacetime intelligence collec-
tion is consistent with the U.N. Charter. 
Despite the abundant evidence of State practice that permits intelligence 
collection beyond the territorial sea and national airspace, China stands alone 
in its continued harassment and interference of U.S. SMS operations in the 
EEZ and U.S. reconnaissance flights in international airspace. Without ques-
tion, intelligence collection seaward of the territorial sea is not subject to 
coastal State control. These activities are consistent with long-standing State 
practice and international law, including UNCLOS and the Chicago Con-
vention. If China wishes to intercept and query a ship or aircraft operating 
off its coast in order to determine its intentions, it may do so. However, such 
intercepts must be carried out in a safe and responsible manner, consistent 
with the Collision Regulations, and with due regard for the rights of ships 
















Exclusive Economic Zones and China’s Nine-Dash Line. The 2016 
Philippines v. China Arbitration Tribunal unanimously concluded that 
UNCLOS comprehensively allocates rights to maritime areas, and that any 
historic rights China may have had to the resources in the South China Sea 
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